The Northern Irish Conflict and the ECHR 1950 Part Two

This blog is a summary outline of the contents and discussions, in the e-book by John A Coyle, entitled “The Northern Irish Conflict and the ECHR 1950 Part Two.” In essence, part two arrives at the viewpoint, that it is not unreasonable to suggest that HMG, may have been during the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998 to varying degrees of culpability, potentially open to being held responsible for breaches and violations of a range of ECHR 1950 Articles. In particular, both specifically; and or in connection with Articles, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15?

In particular, turning to HMG’s reliance on Article 15 ECHR 1950 affording a right to derogate from its ECHR 1950 responsibilities, excepting Articles 2, 3 and 7 ECHR 1950, by virtue of a public emergency? The author advances the summary argument that HMG, during the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998 without question had a range of different and alternative political and security options and choices available to them? Regrettably, these options were not pursued. Historically, HMG has been a proactive political protagonist, involved in a discernible pattern of decisions and actions, in relation to Anglo-Irish relations? Many of these decisions and actions may have been far from an entirely democratic approach; and or by entirely non-violent means?

For example, the conquest of Ireland and political subrogation and management and manipulation of the human geography of the Irish population; and land acquisitions, confiscations, plantations and settlements. Onto the post Act of Union 1800 political, cultural social and economic discrimination of the native Irish Roman Catholics. The unconscionable litany of landlord and tenant legislation, imposed on a native Irish agrarian society? These decisions and actions of successive British governments, resonated deep into the native Irish consciousness, producing resentment, recriminations, protests, riots, insurrections, rebellions and civil war.

Thereby, underpinning the basis for the present day, inconclusive political struggle for Irish democratic sovereignty. HMG political decisions and actions prior to the partition of Ireland and the establishment of the British State of Northern Ireland, by force and in conjunction with political sectarian mischief? These are an example of HMG choices or political decisions and actions? The majority of people who lived in Ireland prior to partition, were very optimist, engaged and open to the long-awaited prospect of the enactment of the proposed home rule legislation? It is debatable as to whether or not, this current conversation and the past hundred years of Anglo-Irish relations, would be remotely identifiable, had the Home Rule Bill been enacted? Again, democratic failures, resulting from the typical HMG set of decisions and actions, which had devastating political and human life and death / hardship consequences? In particular, the politically negligent irresponsible support for a form of a limited apartheid, British State of Northern Ireland? The reinforcement of this political Northern Irish sectarian community understanding, real or perceived? HMG decisions and actions, supporting these political behaviours was unconscionable and has resulted in far reached human suffering? HMG in essence, may give the impression to any interested observer, as simply turning a “blind eye” to the social deprivation, social exclusion and discrimination of the then minority Roman Catholic, British Subjects, in the British State of Northern Ireland? Roman Catholic poverty, unemployment and unchecked discriminatory employment practices, homelessness and housing conditions, which were unfit for human habitation; and no observable planning and development intentions, aimed at providing social housing for this minority? The provision of education and health and social care was the subject of a system of disadvantage, discrimination, social control, criminalisation and emigration? In essence, a hostile, bigoted and prejudice toxic environment for Roman Catholic British Subjects?

There was an inevitable rebellion commencing with civil rights protests which were met with a very heavy-handed RUC / police response. Culminating in the “Battle of the Bogside”. Again, these HMG decisions and actions amounted to a “holding exercise,” aimed at quelling street protests and riots for the time being? Promises made by the British PM Harold Wilson Labour government were not delivered. The change of government, to a British Conservative PM Edward Heath, took British NI policy in a different direction? The outcome was a return to public law and order enforcement? This time via the British Army and the RUC? Street protests and riots amounted to the oppressed and suppressed political “voice of the unheard”? A strict law and public order response by the British Army and RUC and Loyalist sectarian violence, against Roman Catholics, which resulted in Irish Republican violent political protest, initially and for the most part short of international terrorism? HMG’s response was internment without trial, but without bringing about a political settlement, aimed at bedding down in “real time” and capable of political implementation, going forward? In this connection, it cannot be emphasised enough, that there is no attempt in any part of this text, to justify any form of violent political activity; and or rewrite the history of the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998.

HMG’s failures to deliver a Northern Irish Power-Sharing Executive with a Council of Ireland, resulted in continued political violence from both sections of the Northern Irish communities? Again, HMG’s political and security decisions and actions, were further confounded by the killing of fourteen unarmed civil rights protesters on “Bloody Sunday” in Derry in 1972 and the killings in Ballymurphy by the British Paratroopers, in Belfast? The decision to shoot dead street protesting petrol bombers, was a significantly pernicious decision, at a number of levels, apart from loss of life, amounted to the issuing of an edict from all high, where in a young person may be shot dead? Moreover, the word of the security services was gospel and that was that? There were a number such killings and with no probative independent investigation, or inquiries? For example, Dessie Beatty in Derry prior to “Bloody Sunday” and Danny O’Hagan, in Belfast? Furthermore, there was a great sense both in Derry and Belfast, that the truth about the British Paratrooper killings had been deliberately suppressed? Again, this was an HMG decision and action, to act in this way and suppress the truth? These decisions and actions amount to HMG bad faith and security forces bad conduct? The true facts being suppressed for fifty years.

Furthermore, if all of this was not bad enough, HMG decisions and actions of operating a criminal justice system, amounting to a simultaneous set of dual emergency provisions? Essentially, involving both internment without trial and an emergency scheduled criminal offences, system of criminal justice, supported by the Special Diplock Courts. An HMG policy, which without question, only served to protract the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998? Thereby, amounting to an HMG Policy of “Criminalisation” in response to a political set of hostile conditions and circumstances, which were for the most part, created and exacerbated by HMG’s decisions, actions and omissions? Essentially, HMG acted irresponsibly and were at no time an impartial arbiter from the inception of the in the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998.

In this connection, Again, the author feels obliged to state, it cannot be emphasised enough, that there is no attempt in any part of this text, to justify any form of violent political activity; and or rewrite the history of the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998. The essential contentious issue, is that HMG had a range of alternative decisions and actions at their disposal, in a circumstance of unequal power relations? Clearly, HMG chose not to take them? Moreover, as discussed in both part one and two of this text. HMG were without question responsible for further exacerbating the situation. In particular, by unequivocal decisions and actions, which amounted to bad faith and bad conduct, both in terms of lawful due process, arbitrary processes without appropriate safeguards, in relation to both domestic and international jurisprudence?

In particular, HMG’s decisions and actions, during the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998 have for the most part all run against the rules of natural justice, domestic and international law. Involving bad faith and abuse of lawful processes. For example, a litany of HMG decisions and actions which amounted to bad faith and bad conduct over a thirty-year period, ranging from the quelling of street protests by the unbridled killing episodes of “Bloody Sunday” in Derry and in “Ballymurphy,” in Belfast, by the British Army paratroopers, a wartime engagement military regiment, as distinct from a regular British army regiment? The deployment of the SAS British Army regiment, in the execution of an HMG “shoot to kill” policy, as confirmed by the Staker Inquiry; The HMG / security services collusion with loyalist paramilitary killings of the Northern Irish, Roman Catholic, British Subjects, as confirmed by the Stevens and Sampson Inquiries; the HMG negligent policy, in the failure of their the duty of care, in relation to the death of ten hunger strikers, at the H’ Blocks / MAZE HMS Prison, Belfast; the HMG negligent policy, in the failure in their duty of care, in relation to the handling of British State / RUC Special Branch informers and agents; HMG policy of prisoner hostage / internment, based on super-grass informants, by virtue of holding alleged NI conflict related offenders in custody on remand pending a Special Diplock Court trial, which was always going to collapse? The HMG negligent policy, in the failure in their duty of care, in relation to the imprisonment of the “Birmingham Six” and “Guildford Four” in English prisons, which may have quite conceivably been considered, as a form of political hostage taking of Irish men and women, living and working in England? If it is true, that these Northern Irish British Subjects, were all innocent from the outset and this was known by the British security services? Likewise, the bad faith associated with the suppression of the true facts of killing of unarmed civil rights protester on “Bloody Sunday” in Derry and in “Ballymurphy,” in Belfast, by the British Army paratroopers for thirty years? The anticipated and relied upon, counterproductive consequences of accelerated republican and loyalist political violence? Again, the bad police and British Army conduct, in relation to legally held firearms and firearm exhibits in connection with the arrest and interrogation of NI conflict related suspects, who were denied access to a solicitor; and or an appropriate adult; and also charged with a criminal offence, were also denied the right to receive a fair trial, in a properly constituted criminal court, with a judge and jury; and the regular rules of evidence and disclosure to the defence, by the NI prosecution service? In this respect, it must also be borne in mind that approximately 90% of these NI conflict related remand prisoners, were not charged with membership of a proscribed unlawful organisation? Moreover, approximately, 70% of these Northern Irish British Subjects were under twenty-one years age, at the time of the alleged NI conflict related offences and public order offences?

All of which and much more thereby, providing a viable grounding for applying the concept of estoppel, in relation to HMG’s absolute reliance on Article 15 ECHR 1950 public emergency provisions? Essentially, there can be no objective justification, for any derogations from Articles 5, 6, 13. In particular, as to HMG’s decisions and actions, emanating from the optional choice to pursue a policy of “Criminalisation” via the emergency scheduled criminal offences and supported by the Special Diplock Courts system? There were a number of different strategies and policies more in keeping with the concept of defending democracy, which could have been more beneficially pursued? It was without question a defending of democracy imperative, to acknowledge that HMG was not at any time during the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998 an impartial arbiter, but a proactive political protagonist? HMG role in any arbitration and mediation processes, therefore, only relates to their bad faith decisions and actions. There is no question that the political origin of the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1800 -1998 was for the most part historically, caused by and exacerbated by HMG’s decisions, actions, omissions and own making of HMG, in terms of their past decisions and actions, in relation to HMG policy of maintaining a presence on the island of Ireland? In this respect, mindful of the Human Rights Committee, understanding in terms of Preamble to the Universal declaration of Human Rights 1948, it may be of value to reiterate this objective justification, forming the value basis of the concept of “defending democracy,” in terms of vindicating humanity.

In essence, was for the first time in international law, the term “the rule of law” was used in the preamble of the Declaration. The third paragraph of the preamble of the Declaration, reads as follows:

"Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."

It has been said that public protesting and rioting onto the streets, is the response of the unheard. Again, the author feels obliged to state, it cannot be emphasised enough, that there is no attempt in any part of this text, to justify any form of violent political activity; and or rewrite the history of the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998. The essential contentious issue is that HMG had a range of alternative decisions and actions at their disposal in a circumstance of unequal power relations? These were not pursued, as considered and discussed in both part one and two of this text? It is noteworthy, in this connection, post Belfast Agreement 1998, that all of the main British political parties, support and are promoting first and foremost, Northern Ireland’s position within the British Union I.e., the British Conservative and Unionist Party, the British Labour Party, the British Liberal Democrat Party and the UK Independence Party? In this connection, it is very clear that HMG’s decision and actions, were based on political and security choices, which accelerated and protracted the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998? In the authors view, to the extent that reliance on Article 15 ECHR 1950, in relation to Articles 5, and 6 ECHR 1950 renders HMG’s position untenable?

Therefore, as a direct consequence all NI conflict related criminal convictions of Northern Irish, British Subjects, who were not charged with membership of a proscribed unlawful organisation, must be declared invalid, null and void. Presumably, via an appropriate administrative process, effectively sealing and expunging, all such NI conflict related and NI public order offences? This may be achieved in the first instance, via an ECHR 1950 friendly settlement process or via ECHR 1950 claims and enforcement process.

Furthermore, all of those Northern Irish, British Subjects, who were under twenty-one years of age and detained in an NI adult prison, charged with emergency scheduled criminal offences, must therefore, as a direct consequence be considered as being unlawfully detained? Therefore, this category of NI conflict related offences, must also be considered for a sealing and expunging administrative process. This is always providing there is no charge of membership of a proscribed unlawful organisation. Likewise, all of those Northern Irish, British Subjects, under-twenty-one years of age with an adult prison sentence, must in addition to Article 7 ECHR 1950 human rights violation, must also be considered as an unlawful detention, in connection with Articles 5, 6, and 14 ECHR 1950? This is regardless of presenting a defence or not; and or being cajoled, into a guilty plea, always provided, there is no charge for membership of a proscribed unlawful organisation? Furthermore, all those Northern Irish, British Subjects, charged with NI conflict related offences and convicted, via the Special Diplock Courts, whist the dual emergency system of internment without trial and the emergency scheduled criminal offences, existed simultaneously? Likewise, must also be expunged and sealed on the same basis as above?

Turning to those charged with membership of a proscribed unlawful organisation and convicted via the Special Diplock Courts, whist the dual emergency system of internment without trial and the emergency scheduled criminal offences, existed simultaneously must be considered, as a form of internment, without a fair trial, because the security forces decision to intern, was always a security option regardless of the outcome of the Special Diplock Courts process? Alternatively, the Special Diplock Court imposed criminal conviction, must be recorded sealed and expunged, as an internment security antecedent, as distinct from a criminal conviction; and or as being held under the pleasure of HMG?

It is suggested by the author, that ECHR 1950 can be managed via transitional justice process, as part of the Belfast Agreement 1998 implementation processes. I.E, in conjunction, with the Council of Europe / ECHR 1950 and the two sovereign governments of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland. In the first instance, as to the system of jurisprudence based on the English Common law and Irish Constitution, which is underpinned by the same English Common law jurisprudence. In particular, the suspended or constrained English common law rules of natural justice and judges' rules, and as to any other precedents. For example, similar in purpose and intent to clause 62 Magna Charta 1215? Moreover, and very mindful of the contents, sentiments and peace process support for the implementation of the Belfast Agreement 1998 of the late Anglo-Saxon Queen Elizabeth II, via her personally delivered speech at Dublin Castle, Ireland. Thereafter, to be augmented, developed and mediated via by a Council of Europe / ECHR 1950 international law jurisprudence, retrospective processes and procedures.

It is the authors considered opinion, that any friendly settlement arrangement as between the UK government and the government of Ireland, as a part of an ECHR 1950 friendly settlement, and common law type clause 62 Magna Charta 1215 precedents. There should be no difficulty now, post the Belfast Agreement Treaty 1998, to the signing up to the developmental process of an entrenched Northern Irish “Constitutional Sovereignty”, an NI supreme law clause, in the form of a NI Bill of Rights and Freedoms, entrenching the Belfast Agreement / Treaty 1998; and incorporating the institutions supporting democracy. In particular, the human rights commission / ECHR 1950; and or an ECHR invocation, as to a Canadian rights charter “notwithstanding clause “component, as part of the general list of rights; and a NI citizens freedom of choice optional rights, as proposed in the authors e-books entitled a Northern Irish Transitional Justice Home Rule Bill of Rights and Freedoms; and or a Northern Irish Rights Agenda; and or is it the “Last Chance Saloon” for Northern Ireland.

The aforementioned process of fully implementing the Belfast Agreement 1998, must be accompanied by an open and transparent international agreement / accord / treaty. Firstly, in relation to an agreed security architecture, within the context of the “totality of these islands,” essentially as to the national security and defence of these “islands” [Britain and Ireland] and the surrounding waters. Secondly, as to the new post Article 50 Lisbon Treaty 2009, trading and movement jurisdictions, as between the United Kingdom and Ireland; and the European Union / EEA. I.E cognisant, as to the EC / EU guardianship / guarantor's role in the Belfast Agreement 1998? In essence, amounting to a European Commission derogation / dispensation, in connection to the trading jurisdiction and freedom of movement, in relation to Britain and Ireland? Essentially, amounting to a free trade and movement arrangement between Great Britain and Ireland. Thereby, putting the trading jurisdiction into the North Sea and English Channel. The territorial shared sovereignty jurisdiction of the government of Ireland, remaining in the European Union and Northern Ireland, remaining in the trading jurisdiction of both the UK and the EEA (presumably as part of the framework association of sub national micro-states? A viable democratic alternative to the EU / UK NI Protocol (escrow)? The continued pre-EEC freedom of movement as between Britain and Ireland. Presumably, this EC derogation / dispensation may or may not be reflected in the bilateral trading agreements between the EU and UK going forward? Moreover, also in relation to EU and UK financial services agreements. These suggested trading and movement solutions. Cleary point up and reinforce the very obvious requirements, for an agreed, security architecture in advance, as between the UK and EU? In particular, as to the government of Ireland’s position, in connection, with the Lisbon Treaty 2009 defence proposals; and opt outs in the event of an ever-closer union, in a format of the “Untied States of Europe” with its present EU membership; and or a reduced core membership; and or linked membership, going forward? It is the authors view, that the totality of these suggested arrangements, in the long run may be preferable to the EU / UK NI Protocol? The NI assembly democratic mechanism can remain in place, as to the EEA / UK arrangements? The constitutional and territorial position of Northern Ireland, is at all times, ultimately based on the terms of the Belfast Agreement 1998? In this respect, in the light of the disruptions to the peace process and full implementation of the Belfast Agreement 1998, due to the EU/UK NI Protocol. Especially, the British Conservative HMG policy, of using the Northern Irish peace process and situational positioning of the Irish government, as a quid pro quo bargaining chip, in the EU/UK bilateral trading agreements? It is therefore, of paramount importance, that the aforementioned agreements along these lines; and or on a similar basis be concluded. The Belfast Agreement 1998 may not be able to sustain the continued stop start irresponsible disruptions to the peace process? The outcome may be a further subdivision of Ulster / partition of Ireland? That is, those border RPA district councils, on the collapse the Belfast Agreement 1998, seeking to democratically, become part of the nation state of Ireland and to also remain in the EU /EEA?

It is for this reason there is no objective justification for HMG continuing to control and disseminate a false narrative. The process of conceptualization, as to absence of neutrality is of paramount importance going forward and the adoption of the “concept of dual layered legitimacy of sovereign decisions and actions.” Notwithstanding, those State decisions and actions which would be unlawful in the absence of an emergency period. The legislative entrenchment of a NI Home Rule Bill of Rights and Freedoms, renders all such decisions and actions invalid and void for all purposes. That is, all the administration of justice decisions and outcomes prior to the 1998 Agreement / Treaty, are therefore, in relation, to the NI Conflict, all invalidated, at a Sovereign state policy and operational layer of legitimacy of decisions and actions. Quite apart from the misuse of emergency provisions, during the Anglo-Irish NI conflict 1968-1998. HMG clearly, acted ultra vires beyond the emergency powers afforded to them by Parliament, as illustrated and discussed in this e-book. Thereby, short of an amnesty, preserving the integrity of the concept of a jurisprudence based on the common law of England and reverting in normality to the unrestricted rules of natural justice and a democracy based on the rule of law.

Regrettably, many of the revelations which have emerged post NI conflict are very demoralising, since most of the information which has come to light, without question, does stand up to factual analysis and is open to extrapolating reasonable evidence-based suppositions, as to the existence of what may amount to British State criminality and human rights violations? This is separate and distinct from any type of ungrounded allegations, or conspiracy theories; and or from any attempts to rewrite these identified, rules of law and human rights aspects of the history of the Anglo- Irish /NI conflict 1968-1998?